A neo-institutional economic approach to automated speed enforcement systems by Laurent Carnis
ORIGINAL PAPER
A neo-institutional economic approach to automated speed
enforcement systems
Laurent Carnis
Received: 2 December 2008 /Accepted: 7 January 2010 /Published online: 26 February 2010
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract
Purpose From the economic literature, the automated speed
enforcement schemes can be interpreted as a specific
institution, which works to the reduction of the social cost
and enables a better use of road infrastructures. It also
represents a particular technology for producing traffic safety.
Method Analyzing the ASE schemes through an economic
approach stresses crucial characteristics to investigate. Our
analysis proposes to follow the economic approach guidelines
to identify and to analyze an ASE program (resources, goals
and appraisal).
Results and Conclusion This framework also enables a
systematic analysis of the ASE schemes by emphasizing on
the important characteristics. It makes also possible to
establish comparisons between different systems and to be
able to identify a specific risk regulation regime. An
application is done for the French system (Contrôle
Automatisé or CA) and the British program (Safety Camera
Programme or SCP).
Keywords Speed offenses . Speed enforcement .
Automatic speed enforcement . Institutionalism . Economics
1 Introduction
Since the late 1980s automated speed detection systems
have gradually come to replace the traditional techniques.
Utilization of such systems has become a clear necessity for
any government seeking significant reduction of the traffic
hazards associated with excessive speed. It has, in addition,
radically modified driver behavior, police handling of the speed
question and the approach of government road safety bodies.
The development of the new speed detection method and
its adoption by numerous governments has highlighted a
considerable diversity both in the actual techniques used
and in the operational and organizational modalities. There
is an enormous literature devoted to the effects on road
safety produced by these systems, with almost all data
converging on a resultant significant diminution of the
number of road accident victims [18, 36]. By contrast there
are very few studies putting the organizational dimensions
of different systems into perspective [6, 8, 33, 37]. Does
there exist an adequate means of developing and imple-
menting such systems [19]? And can we define operational
modalities and their adaptation to specific issues [4]? How
can we proceed to get adequate international comparisons?
We propose to develop a framework inspired by the neo-
institutional economic approach. Indeed the automated
speed enforcement (ASE) system can be considered as an
institution and thus as a process contributing to reduction of
the uncertainty of traffic movement [25, 26] (Section 2). In
economic terms, they represent specific and appropriate
combinations of means to reach particular aims. By
following the neo-institutional economic approach, it
allows for the designing of an analytical framework
identifying the means, objectives and results associated
with them. It also proposes criteria for the systematic
identification of these systems (Section 3). This paper also
proposes a rough application to the French ASE (Contrôle
Automatisé) and the Speed Camera Programme imple-
mented in Great-Britain to illustrate the potentialities of
such an approach (Section 4).
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2 Automated speed enforcement system:
an neo-institutional perspective
The ASE system can be interpreted as an institution whose
purpose is the control of the hazards associated with road
use and the reduction of the infrastructure’s shared costs in
terms of exchange and use, or externalities.1 It should also
be emphasized that an institution includes formal (speed
limit for instance) and informal rules, which constraint
human behavior ([26], p. 4). They represent resources or
means mobilized for reaching specific aims.
2.1 Towards a definition of ASE system
ASE is one of a range of possible ways, among many
varied speed detection devices (laser handguns...), of
identifying those who fail to observe speed limits [12].
Comparisons become possible because there are also
different kinds of ASE organizations. Is there a real interest
of establishing comparisons between a national speed
program and few radar devices installed through a city?
We propose to define the ASE systems by five basic
characteristics in order to make true comparisons possible.
(1) ASE systems rest upon automation. The device uses
relatively sophisticated computerized techniques en-
abling a large reduction of the number of human
interventions in the process of offender identification
and sanctioning (direct digital network transmission of
data, computer identification of license plates and of
offenders’ addresses...).
(2) ASE systems allow massive deterrence. The device
means a significant increase in the intensiveness of
police surveillance and in the probability of effective
detection of offenders.
(3) ASE systems imply more finely honed division of the
enforcement process. The tasks of detection and
sanctioning are clearly separated. That is not always
the case with the traditional systems, where the police
officer can behave like a “judge” by being able to
modulate tolerance margins and thus establishing the
legality or otherwise of certain speeds [36] or by
showing leniency [13, 31].
(4) ASE systems constitute an integrated system and need a
specific organizational rationale. The ASE system rests
upon a special institutional design, with the creation of
a specific organization to manage and to coordinate the
program (adaptation of the judicial framework, defini-
tion of specific organizational rules) [11]. In brief, the
overall system is an integrated one calling for coordi-
nation mechanisms and functional consistency.
(5) The implementation of ASE systems are based on a
prior political decision implying political effects and
have to be supported by political commitment. The
ASE system is backed by real political determination.
This political decision is generally part of a broader
strategic plan either aimed at reduction of road hazards
or reflecting a governmental priority (modernization of
administration or a search for efficiency). In a way it
calls into question the previous modalities of interac-
tion between the different authorities (police forces,
department of justice, department of transport...), and
between those authorities and road users.
Consequently, the setting up of an ASE system involves
choices concerning organizational and institutional dimen-
sions. It is also a costly alternative to reduce traffic hazards.
It implies to invest large amounts of resources. How could
we understand the choices to implement such a system?
The neo-institutional economic approach appears very
useful to bring first elements of answer.
2.2 An neo-institutional economic definition of automated
enforcement systems
The road network facilitates exchanges of goods, ideas and
persons via the mobility it allows. The rapidity with which
such transfers take place means a certain reduction of the
distance factor and of the transaction and communication
costs between individuals. It means also an increase of
costs with more traffic hazards [15].
In this context the installation and proliferation of
automated speed enforcement systems can be seen as the
appearance of a relatively effective institution aimed at
reducing the costs associated with widespread vehicle use
by offering road users a better grasp and control of their
environment ([24], pp. 9–10). Relevant here is the
definition put forward by North ([25], p. 97) ‘They
[institutions] consist of both informal constraints (sanc-
tions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct),
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property right).’
More specifically, the role of institution consists in
producing a stable structure for individual actions and so
allowing for reduced uncertainty in every-day decision-
making, and especially here for the driving choices. They
work as guides for human interaction—the user can expect,
for example, a certain uniformity of traffic speeds—but also
represent constraints, modifying the field of the possible in
respect of individual choices: speed-related behaviors
violating a defined threshold, for instance, will be sanc-
tioned ([26], p. 3 sqq). In this way the ASE system
functions as a road traffic cost-cutter.
More precisely, the ASE system represents an institution
which is itself integrated into an institutional structure. Its1 Costs borne by agents, whereas the decision was taken by another one.
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implementation does not take place on virgin soil. ASE
means that the government has to decide public spending
and to make trade-offs among different interventions. ASE
systems is part of a more far-reaching policy of transport
safety [6, 30]. It is a part of a more general speed strategy
[1]. Then potential interlinks between different organiza-
tions in charge of speed enforcement have to be taken into
consideration. It must integrate into and coordinate with the
traditional road safety activities of the police force [9, 11].
The institutional frame means also the interweaving of formal
constraints (the Highway Code, the Criminal Code) and
informal rules (the specific use of the devices, which can be
left to the judgment of police officers, social condemnation of
certain speed-related behaviors...), which yield interactions
whose outcomes are sometimes unexpected.
ASE constitutes a sophisticated kind of institution, based
on technology and organizational design. It aims at
managing the human environment and its complexities.
The driver is not conceived as an “automata” whose excess
speed would reflect only an error of judgment, but
individuals with specific preferences, capable of defining
strategies for avoiding speed checks and challenging the
devices concerned [5, 27], and who can draw on resources
that are technical (radar detectors), social (“knowing
somebody” or social network) and political (mobilization
and protest involving the media and politicians).
3 ASE systems as productive process
The application of neo-institutional economic analysis tools
to the study of ASE systems enables the method to be seen
as a specific technique for production of detection and
identification of speed limit offenders. In this way, it
remains possible to apply an overall analysis by suggesting
that such systems, which are designed and framed
differently, imply mobilization and combination of different
resources (outlays) with a view to attaining a particular
goal which are going to produce outcomes (advantages)
that may ultimately be subjected to evaluation.
3.1 The means: the question of production factors
and of productive technique
Among the means several separate dimensions can be
identified: the operational, technical and organizational. The
operational dimension first of all includes a characteristic
of mobility of the system (a). Systems may be fixed as in
Tasmania, mobile as in Queensland2 and Denmark [2]. They
may also be mixed as in France [9]. The characteristic of
transparency (b) signifies that the authorities can either use
detection that is concealed (as in Victoria) or made public via
warnings in the media, on the Internet or via appropriate
roadside signing near detection areas (as in Queensland).
ASE systems can be associated with a communication
policy (c). This may involve advertising campaigns or
communication measures using the various media [7].
System density (d) has emerged as a crucial characteristic
of any detection system, as it indicates the extent of
surveillance and of the efforts being put into detection by
the authorities. System density can be evaluated in different
ways: according to the number of devices in operation, the
hours of operation for instances. Another way of proceeding
is to relate the effort made to the number of drivers, the
population or the size of the network under surveillance [34].
In addition, fixed devices may be used at random or
continuously. Detection areas can be checked regularly, but
also discontinuously by using mobile devices. Thus perma-
nence of detection (e) represents another crucial operational
dimension when halo phenomena are taken into account.
Cross-referencing of temporal and spatial halo effects
enables definition of surveillance grids [12].
The technical dimension is directly related to the
productive conditions and the techniques of production used.
To be taken into account here are the judicial framework (a)
and the rights of the offender (the right to challenge the
alleged violation, application of the owner onus principle...).
The technical dimension also includes a financial charac-
teristic (b). The detection system may be based on a self-
financing policy (cost recovery system in Great-Britain until
2006) or on a direct financing by the authorities. This
characteristic also raises the issue of the how the accrued
revenue is to be used, which depends among other things on
the constraints of public finance laws or on the existence of a
no-fault accident system as it is operated in Victoria
(Australia) or in New Zealand for instance. The lessons
drawn from the economic analysis of illegal acts, which
shows that the level of deterrence hinges on a combination of
effects associated with the intensiveness of surveillance and
the severity of the sanction stresses the importance to define
an optimal deterrent policy (c) [3, 13]. Thus the ASE
systems can be characterized by different combinations of
surveillance and sanction. It is also crucial that the scale of
penalties and the modalities of the sanctions are taken into
account, as they affect the functioning of the whole system
(fines and/or demerit point system3...). The technical
dimension also includes the installation criteria (d) for the
detection devices (abnormal driving speed level, black spot...).
Lastly, this dimension involves the technological choice (e)
2 Queensland decided recently to implement fixed radars.
3 In France, the implementation of an ASE system drove to an huge
increase of people having lost their driving license with repeated speed
offences. Henceforth some road users drive without driving licenses to
keep their jobs. ASE system can then represent a cost to mobility.
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made by the authorities for or against the use of digital
photographic processes with more or less sophisticated levels
of automation and which are more or less costly.
The organizational dimension framed the location of
the decision-making center (a) which is characterized by a
process of more or less centralization within the framework.
The organizational structure also necessitates specifying the
organization in charge of the operational dimension, any
connections it may have with other stakeholders, and its
institutional integration (b). This may be an administrative
or action program body which decides on the strategy to be
adopted, while the strictly operational running is in the
hands of the police. The system can be entrusted to an
administrative body or even to a private company as part of
a delegation contract or be managed directly by the police
organization. Thus arises the issue of the status of the
operator and how it is paid for (c): administrative agency,
police body or private company. Lastly the operational
dimension poses the question of the consequences of the
institutional change (d) entailed by the implementation of
an automated system capable of supplanting traditional
procedures. In Great-Britain, the implementation of the
Speed Camera Programme was followed by a decrease of
20% of police officers dedicated to traffic safety tasks ([28],
p. 11).
3.2 The aims: defining the objectives of productive
organization
The objectives sought by the introduction of an automated
system are just as numerous. However, the common goal
consists in reducing the costs of use of the road traffic
infrastructure. The aim is to reduce transaction costs by
diminishing the uncertainty involved in vehicle use as we
showed in Section 1. These objectives may be (a) a
reduction of road hazards at both local and national
level. Obviously whether the goal is an overall or local
effect will influence the terms and conditions of the
system.4 The quest for a reduction of road hazards can
also proceed from a determination to reduce (b) traffic
speeds. More precisely, it can involve reducing the average
speed, the most excessive speeds, or reducing the number
of drivers who commit offences. This public policy can be a
response to (c) environmental considerations, so as to
facilitate management of congestion situations, pollution or
such specific risks as driving in tunnels. There can also be a
fit with (d) wider political aims such as the sustainability
of the transport sector and, via traffic diversion, the
redistribution of movement to other modes of transport.
3.3 The results: the outcome of production efforts
The mobilization of resources and the choice of a production
technique enable the effective implementation of an ASE
system whose functioning produces particular results.
These results can be interpreted in terms of (a) the evolution
of speed indicators: average speed, speed distribution, speed
broken down according to the type of networks or the type
of users. The impact on (b) the volume of speed offences is
also crucial. What has to be taken into account here is their
breakdown according to the networks, the types of vehicles
and the level of excess speed. Further indicators could be
second/repeated offences and second/repeated offenders. The
effects on (c) road hazard reduction can be assessed via
changes in the number of victims and accidents and death
rate per head, per driver or per kilometer traveled.
Calculation of road hazard reduction cannot be restricted to
the fall in the number of road accident victims on a given
network, but must also include other speed-related damage
(medical and rehabilitation expenses for road accident
victims and the cost of material damage).
For the authorities a broader, more ambitious approach
involves a correlation between the gains and the outlay
associated with the introduction of automated speed enforce-
ment. This means adopting (d) benefit-cost approaches and
correlating the implementation and running expenses with
the savings on damage, which needs that regular audits are
made. This policy is above all concerned with efficient,
effective use of resources. The benefit-cost approach is not
exclusive, some other alternatives are possible as cost-
effectiveness, or regulatory budget approach [22]. Another
result consists in focusing on (e) the system’s financial
dimension to take into account its potential sustainability,
improvement and eventual expansion. Lastly (f) the social
acceptability and public perception of the system repre-
sent a further measurable result of the action taken by the
authorities [17]. This result allows for evaluation of the
reception given to the goals, the functioning and the results
of the detection system to identify any changes in this regard
and, when necessary, to enable the authorities to grade their
communication policy, and to modify the circumstances of
installation of the devices and the severity of the sanctions.
This serves also to demonstrate that the aim of the exercise is
to reduce traffic hazards and not, as opponents of this type of
detection frequently allege, to fill the coffers of the state by
fiscal means.
4 A special application of the model to the French CA
and to the British speed camera programme
In this section, our neo-institutional economic framework is
applied to two ASE systems: the French CA (Contrôle
4 In general mobile devices allow for overall deterrence, while the
fixed equivalents enable solutions for local problems whose effects on
the rest of the network remain limited.
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Automatisé) and the British Speed Camera Programme
(SCP). We first present briefly the two systems by
describing how they are organized, the used means, the
defined objectives and their results. Then first elements of
synthesis are proposed and implications coming from the
previously defined framework are identified (Table 1).
4.1 Study design
We used the case studies approach for our research purpose
[35]. This investigation rests upon the access to official
documents and administrative reports. The governmental
websites, academic studies and the analysis of official
statistical data series also provided very useful information.
We were invited by police organizations to attend speed
enforcement operations. Interviews with researchers, police
officers and officials in charge of the operation of the ASE
system in France and in Great-Britain were realized. Our
research also benefited from presentations concerning the
working of both Traffic Camera Offices and from scientific
exchanges with scholars.
France and Great-Britain are two European countries,
which implemented an important ASE system to reduce the
number of road accident victims and damages and to enforce
speed limit. Although Great-Britain introduced the speed
cameras for the first time in 1992, the study only focuses on
the period 1999–2006 concerned with the National Safety
Camera Programme. The French system starts with the
installation of first devices in November 2003. Since its
implementation, it has been knowing an ongoing develop-
ment process: the government recently announced that 4,500
speed and red light cameras will be installed by 2012.
4.2 Historical background and brief presentation of both
systems
4.2.1 The British case
The British government experimented the first speed
cameras in London in 1992 with the West London camera
demonstration project [23]. In 1995, a first cost-benefit
analysis showed clearly that the program generated
‘substantial net benefits’ [21], which was confirmed by
other further studies ([16], pp. 5). However the report
mentions a mismatch for the funding responsibilities and
defends implicitly the “netting-off”5 system for funding the
program. In 2000, after a short experimentation period, the
national recovery scheme was introduced and local safety
camera partnerships operate the system throughout the police
jurisdictions. A new scheme has recently been launched by the
government in April 2007, which implies a direct funding
under the supervision of the Department for Transport.
The local authorities decided to install more automatic
devices, because of good results obtained [8]. Indeed,
numerous researches showed that the SCP constitutes an
effective system to reduce speeding behaviors (−31% of
speed offenders between 2001 and 2004) and the number of
road hazards (the number of people killed or seriously
injured were reduced by 42% at camera sites) [10]. It is a
cost effective system, because it yields 2.7 more pounds for
each pound it costs. The number of speed operated cameras
during the National Safety Camera Programme was roughly
5,000. At present, the government seeks to consolidate the
system instead of pursuing its extension.
Different stakeholders join in the working of local
partnerships (local government, police organization, ambu-
lance and fire services...). The local partnership operate
randomly fixed and mobile radars devices. The British
system depends basically on fixed radar devices installed in
urban contexts (roughly 45% of the total number of
devices) [11]. The authorities decided to advertise the
driver for the presence of a speed control: road signs were
installed near the radar devices.
One main institutional characteristic of the British
system is the adoption of a self-funding scheme. The local
partnership bore the maintenance, operation and installment
costs of these devices and is reimbursed with the collected
fines. This cost-recovery scheme permits a rapid develop-
ment of radars devices through the country while insuring
the financial sustainability of the different local partner-
ships. A net revenue of 22 million pounds was yielded for
2003/2004 exercise.
This ASE system rests upon relationships of account-
ability between the national board and the local partner-
ships. The national board appeared as a necessity for
making possible homogeneous practices of enforcement at
the local level, whereas the local partnerships keep on
benefiting from operational autonomy, stressing the impor-
tance of taking into account local constraints. This
autonomy implies different local systems of governance.
Polycentrism characterizes this institutional organization.
The British program also gives importance to commu-
nication towards the public and to evaluation practices, that
allows to benefit from a high public acceptance level of a
very intensive program of enforcement. The communica-
tion policy is a part of the strategy, not only to improve the
efficiency of the programme but also to make the
implementation of additional radars devices socially ac-
ceptable. Although the SCP was strongly supported by the
great part of population, this support decreased with the
implementation of additional speed cameras. Moreover
5 This funding scheme was also called ‘hypothecation’. It means the
safety camera programme is self-funded, the revenues of fines
collected covering the costs for operating the cameras managed by
each local partnership.
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associations of drivers challenge the official results regard-
ing traffic safety figures and dispute the efficiency of
automated speed enforcement. The evaluation of this public
policy is complex enough to encourage such debate.
4.2.2 The French case6
After a short experimental period in 2003, the first radar
devices were introduced by the end of this year. The
deployment of an automatic speed enforcement program
was facilitated by a favorable political context with a strong
commitment from President Chirac, who declared traffic
safety a national top priority. The objective to reduce the
number of road accident victims appears more as a political
goal than a search for the reduction of the social cost arising
from road accidents. There were roughly 7,000 road
fatalities before the implementation of the ASE system,
and less than 5,000 in 2008. At present, the French system
operates roughly 2400 radar devices.7 The number of
automated radar devices in use comprised 36% mobile
and 64% fixed. Since the creation of the CA the authorities
have been trying to adhere to a proportion of 1/3
unsignalled mobile devices, in the interests of specific
deterrence, and 2/3 signalled fixed devices in the interests
of overall deterrence. The intention is to combine a
crackdown of enforcement with driver education, to mix
general deterrence and specific deterrence. The radar
devices are installed mainly through the interurban road
network. Another strategy followed by the authorities is to
grid the road network with speed cameras to deter the road
users to commit speed offences wherever they drive, but
also to change durably their driving behaviour.
The organization is hugely centralized with the DPICA,8
an administrative body in charge of strategic decision and
management. The decisions on the choices of location sites
are made in collaboration with the representatives of the
State at each département. The problems of speed behav-
iors, the relatively important level of road victims or/and
the impossibility to conduct traditional enforcement consti-
tute criteria for choosing control sites. Operational man-
agement of mobile devices is handled by the Gendarmerie
and the National Police,9 whereas fixed devices are fully
automated. They are operated without humane assistance.
The main characteristics of the French system are its
high technological sophistication with a near complete
automation process [29] and a centralized system relatively
free of all accountability dimension. The French ASE yielded
huge revenues since its implementation. In 2008 the collected
fines amount to 550million euros, whereas the operation costs
were 200 million euros. Although the government asserts than
12,000 lives were saved by the ASE system, scientific
evaluation and economic analysis were not really undertaken.
The French authorities adopted a regulatory budget ap-
proach. A dedicated budget is granted to operate the system
and to insure its expansion. The system rests upon a direct
funding by government. A recent released report empha-
sized on the financial sustainability of the system. Costs
would increase with the expansion of the CA, whereas the
revenues would decline with the reduction of committed
speed offences. We can expect organizational changes for
CA in a near future.
4.3 First elements of synthesis and implications
The British program has many strong advantages. The self-
funding rule shows that the public authorities gives
importance to a good use of public money. Thus the British
system applies the “Best Value” policy, combining the
principles of economy, effectiveness and efficiency [14].
The decision to create a guide for operating the program
indicates also concern for its social acceptability and the
willingness of reaching an homogeneous working among
the local partnerships facing different local considerations
and constraints. The British program also shows a true
ability for resilience with three working and organizing
schemes since 1992. Flexibility is one of its main qualities
to face a changing environment. The criteria for choosing a
speed control site are accurate enough for implementing
rationally the radar devices. However, the concern of a
good use of public resources transforms this approach into
a financial approach through undertaken audits and many
financial controls and rules to obey. This could put in
danger ultimately the existence of the system itself. Indeed
an efficient partnership means a reduction of revenues
(because speed offenders are deterred) and insufficient
resources to fund its operation in the future. It is
undoubtedly one reason explaining the recent adoption of
the operating rules of the program. Another major defect is
the willingness of political authorities to replace manual
police controls by adopting an ASE system to enforce the
speed limits. The number of traffic police officers was
reduced roughly by 20% between 1996 and 2004 in Great-
Britain. Then it creates a specific division of enforcement
labor between the manual speed enforcement and the
automatic one, which needs to find appropriate means of
coordination between the different organizations. Indeed
the automatic devices can not constitute an answer for all
situations of speeding behaviors and overlapping situations
8 Direction de Projet Interministérielle Contrôle Automatisé.
7 The objective of authorities is to install 500 additional devices each
year until 2012.
6 A more detailed presentation can be found in Carnis [11].
9 France has two national Police forces: the National Police, which is
the main civil law enforcement agency, with primary jurisdiction in
cities and large towns; and the military Gendarmerie, with primary
jurisdiction in smaller towns and rural areas.
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of enforcement have to be avoided to limit inefficiencies.
Moreover the punishment scale is not graduated enough.
Indeed punishment is weakly commensurate with the
importance of the speed excess.10 A reflection has to be
undertaken on this issue to make more acceptable the
system by the public and to introduce fairness among speed
offenders. Another point deserves attention. It deals with
the optimal size of jurisdictions of local partnerships.
Indeed scale economies (reduction of average cost of a
unit of enforcement) could be found by reorganizing the
frontiers of partnerships to make a better coordination
among actors and to reduce the total costs of operation. But
it means the audit process does not circumscribe the
evaluation of the program to an efficiency in terms of road
hazard reduction and a cost-benefit ratio.
The French system also presents several interesting
advantages. This system can be termed ‘techno-centric’,
being founded on a centralizing and hierarchic rationale in
which the center controls what is done locally through
technocratic and technological power networks. Such
structure allows to reduce the costs of transaction among
the different actors. Coordination is then less costly because
decision is taken by a small number of actors. It enables to
coordinate the different operators more easily and to reach a
relatively homogeneous policy. However the technology
used by this system is more expensive than alternative
technological devices and implies technical problems of
connection with the CTN (Centre National de Traitement or
Traffic Camera Office). Another key characteristic is the
political dimension of the choice of developing an ASE
system to reinforce the traditional techniques of speed
enforcement. The existence of a complementary effect has
to be stressed: the implementation of such a system does
not lead automatically to the disappearance of manual
process and to the exclusion of police officers from this
operational activity. On the contrary, ASE system enables
to allocate released police resources toward the most urgent
traffic policing tasks.
However the French system has to face key issues either.
The absence of an economic approach to the system implies
the impossibility to determine the optimal size of the
system, to locate the most urgent sites to give priority for
installing the radar devices, and to analyze its financial
sustainability. The punishment scale is a little bit more
graduated than its British counterpart. However a main
critic recently raised against the system is the coupling
effect implied by the demerit points on the driving license.
Many drivers have their driving licenses withdraw11 and
drive without it. The coupling effect of a fine and an
administrative sanction yields a severe punishment, which
was not perceived with the manual speed enforcement
because it was associated with a low level of detection.
Investigations are also necessary to know more on repeat
speed offenders in order to find an appropriate answer and
introduce adapted punishment. Finally the homogeneous
practices of enforcement can be put into question with the
autonomy given to police officers for choosing the location
of control for the mobile radars, which stresses the absence
of an handbook and the necessity to define more formal
rules for operating the system in a similar way.
The French CA and the British SCP illustrates the
different possibilities of designing and framing an ASE
system. Different institutional frameworks are possible: the
level of centralization, the place given to the police
organization for operating the speed cameras, the design
of governance system, or the importance given to evalua-
tion and economic dimensions. Consequently coordination
becomes a crucial dimension for implementing and operat-
ing correctly an ASE. It also implies a government has to
find appropriate means for producing coordination to make
its public policy effective whatever the ASE system
implemented.
5 Conclusion
The definition of ASE systems identification criteria based
largely on a neo-institutional economic approach is a point
of departure allowing not only for a balanced perspective
on the different automated detection systems, but also for a
more extended comparison between different countries.
Moreover, economic analysis and application of the
economist’s tools make possible certain appreciable con-
clusions for the public-sector decision maker and for this
particular public health issue, as we tried to show with an
application to two European ASE programs. When the
French system is termed ‘techno-centric’ and the British
speed camera programme is characterized by its polycen-
trism, we emphasize on the importance of the institutional
dimension. These particular institutional frames were
selected, because the government expected they were the
most adapted ones to reach the objectives of public policy.
Their implementation would be made more easily consid-
ering the country institutional organization. The British
system shows a greater flexibility to be adjusted to local
considerations, whereas it requires more costs of coordina-
10 It is one consequence related to the working of the fixed penalty. A
same penalty is given for different speed excess. Consequently, it is
worth for the drivers committing a higher speed excess while bearing
a same punishment.
11 In 2008 roughly 98,000 driving licences were cancelled after the
driver lost his 12 demerit points.
10 Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2010) 2:1–12
tion for its operation. The French system with a higher
degree of centralization than its British counterpart is less
flexible, but it requires a more simple organization for
current speed enforcement operation. Contingent consid-
erations are undoubtedly at stake when an adapted
institutional design is chosen.
The design of an ASE system as an institution makes
uncertainty management a core aspect of the resource
allocation process. To conceive ASE system as a particular
institution opens new perspectives to find new solutions to
fight against traffic hazards. It emphasizes that the
traditional vehicle-driver-infrastructure framework used to
decrypt the road risk analysis and policy has to be amended
by a new element: the institutional dimension. The
institutional dimension interacts undoubtedly with the other
elements of the traditional triptych, but more investigations
have to be made to know the different road risk ‘regulation
regimes’ and to determine the crucial characteristics [20].
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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